We present a thought-provoking study of two monetary models: the cash-in-advance and the Lagos and Wright (2005) models. We report that the different approach to modeling money-reduced-form vs. explicit role-neither induces fundamental theoretical nor quantitative differences in results. Given conformity of preferences, technologies and shocks, both models reduce to one difference equation. The equations do not coincide only if price distortions are differentially imposed across models. To illustrate, when cash prices are equally distorted in both models equally large welfare costs of inflation are obtained in each model. Our insight is that if results differ, then this is due to unequal assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs cash transactions, not the explicit details about the role of money.
Introduction
The question "what's the best approach to modeling money?" is one of those that economists have struggled with for a while and is yet unsettled. Three decades ago, some viewed the overlapping generations framework as the only satisfactory approach to modeling money [5] , while others saw merits from placing real balances in the utility function and noted that such a device could be used to unify several results in the literature [4, 13] . These days, there is a lively debate about the framework proposed in [7] , in relation to reduced-form models of money.
Advocates of the LW model underscore its appeal as a tool for theoretical analysis because unlike reduced-form models the role of money is made explicit [15, p.267 ].
This modeling approach contrasts with reduced-form models, such as those imposing cash-in-advance constraints [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ]. Yet, one may also note key similarities with the cash-in-advance framework. In both models agents synchronously alternate between a centralized market (CM) and a decentralized market (DM); consumption utility depends on where the purchase is settled, in the DM or CM; and asset trading decisions (adjustments of money balances, in particular) are made before a random shock is observed; [10, p.10-11] and [7, pp.462-66] . It has also been argued that the explicit microfoundation of money can make a significant difference for quantitative results; in particular, it can generate higher welfare costs of inflation than reduced-form models [7, p.463-4] .
These considerations have raised several questions among monetary economists.
Are there differences in the main equilibrium equations associated with these two theoretical platforms? If so, what model features are responsible for such disparities?
Finally, are these two frameworks generally incapable of producing similar quantitative results? We offer some answers by discussing what we found when we juxtaposed the models' main equations and quantitative implications for the welfare cost of inflation. We proceed as follows. Section 2 lays out the cash-in-advance framework following [10] , which has an explicit and transparent description of the physical environment. Section 3 reports the main mathematical relationships describing equilibrium allocations in the LW model and identifies the price distortion due to nonlinear pricing. Unlike the cash-in-advance model, in the LW model Nash bargaining determines prices in some transactions (which must be settled with the exchange of money) but not others; hence, a price distortion may exist, depending on the seller's bargaining power. Subsequently, the two frameworks are placed on equal footing in terms of preferences, technologies, and shocks. A way to introduce price distortions in the cash-in-advance model-without altering its fundamental structure-is illustrated, which involves a tax on cash revenues. At this point, the equations describing equilibrium allocations in the cash-in-advance model are derived.
Our analysis mainly focuses on stationary equilibrium because the literature based on the LW model has almost entirely focused on such equilibrium. We find that the equations characterizing stationary equilibrium in the LW model when sellers have no bargaining power coincide with the equations that characterize stationary competitive equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model. This also holds when sellers do have some bargaining power, when the price distortion from Nash bargaining is replicated in the other model. This is accomplished using a tax on cash revenues (equivalently, a sales tax on cash purchases) but other distortionary mechanisms could be explored.
Such correspondence between equations immediately extends outside of steady-state, if sellers have no bargaining power and workers have isoelastic preferences; otherwise, a one-to-one mapping between the equations cannot be established outside of steadystate. Hence, there may exist dynamical equilibria which are not the same in the two models. Before concluding with Section 4 we propose a quantitative exercise, showing that the welfare costs of inflation in the cash-in-advance model match those in the LW model.
The main insight is thus that the two models (CIA, LW) reduce to a single difference equation. The equations correspond if the price distortion in one model is matched in the other model, in which case one cannot distinguish one model from the other based on their quantitative performance. The differences in the models' main equations reduce to differences in the pricing mechanism imposed in decentralized markets. Hence, to the extent that the trading mechanism is not viewed as being an integral part of the model, or a primitive, then modeling money explicitly as opposed to imposing cash-in-advance constraints neither induces theoretical nor quantitative differences in results. The price mechanism assumed to govern those transactions that must be settled with the exchange of cash is the source of differences. Overall, the analysis offers an important pedagogical lesson in the quest for the "best approach to modeling money." On the one hand, it provides a unique perspective on the similarities in the performance of two models of money that are often perceived as being very different. On the other hand, it helps a reader to more deeply understand how to put to use such general equilibrium models; in particular, it suggests that one does not need to go through the heavier machinery of the LW model for many research questions. 1
A cash-in-advance model
This section discusses a standard general-equilibrium macroeconomic environment with incomplete markets. It is a compact version of the model in [10] , where money is introduced by means of cash-in-advance constraints. The model adopts the convention that agents periodically alternate between centralized and decentralized markets, which is also found in the LW model. Time is discrete and infinite, denoted t = 0, 1, . . . There is a constant population composed of a continuum of infinitely-lived agents, who are ex-ante homogeneous and expected utility maximizers. Preferences are defined over non-storable produced goods and labor. Each agent owns equal shares in a representative firm that produces goods using the concave technology F , which has labor as the only factor of production.
In a period, traders alternate synchronously between centralized and decentralized markets. Each period is divided into two subperiods, say, morning and afternoon. A decentralized market is open in the morning, while a centralized market is open in the afternoon. To introduce money, it is assumed that some of the morning trades must 1 We thank Christian Zimmerman for making this point in his NEP-DGE blog. be settled immediately with the exchange of money (= cash trades) while others can be settled in the afternoon (= credit trades). Goods purchased with cash are distinct from goods purchased on credit, called goods 1 and 2, respectively. Money is injected through lump-sum transfers by a central bank.
Let s t denote a shock realized at the start of t. The shock-which affects the households' ability to consume and produce cash goods-is drawn from a time-invariant set. Let {s t } ∞ t=0 denote a path of shocks and let S t = (s 1 , ..., s t ) denote a history of shocks (from the set of all possible histories), which is known prior to all period t trading. Let f t (S t ) denote the density of the history S t . Neither F nor the money supply process depend on S t . 2 Events on date t evolve as follows.
Morning of t (≡ decentralized market) :
The shock s t is observed. Households and firms trade goods 1 and 2, and labor. Households hold M t (S t−1 ) money and buy c 1t (S t ) goods in exchange for money (= cash goods), buy c 2t (S t ) goods on credit (=credit goods) and supply h t (S t ) labor to the firm on credit. The firm demands h F t (S t ) labor, buying it on credit, and supplies F (h F t (S t )) goods. Credit trades are settled in the afternoon of t.
Afternoon of t (≡ centralized market) :
Credit trades executed in the morning of t are settled. Firms pay wages for work supplied in the morning and pay dividends out of morning profits. Households pay for credit goods bought in the morning. The central bank retires the old money supplyM t−1 and issues a new money supplyM t through lump-sum money transfers Θ t to households. Trade on a financial market also takes place: households trade state-contingent claims to money to be delivered in the afternoon of t + 1. Household exits the period holding M t+1 (S t ) money.
2 A shock can also be added in the afternoon market, but since there are no such shocks in the LW model, that case is not studied here. The order of opening of the markets can also be inverted, without loss in generality.
Firm and households' optimal choices
On date t, given history S t , the constraint of the firm is
where c F 1t (S t ) and c F 2t (S t ) denote cash and credit goods. Because cash and credit goods are distinct, let p jt (S t ) denote the nominal spot price of good j = 1, 2 and let w t (S t ) be the nominal spot wage on t. Nominal profits (net dollar inflows) on the
which are distributed as dividends in the afternoon.
Since the firm sells for cash and for credit, payments accrue as follows: in the morning, it receives cash payments for cash-goods sales, and in the afternoon it receives payments for the morning's credit sales. Let q t (S t ) denote the date−0 price of a claim to one dollar delivered in the afternoon of t, contingent on S t (= state-contingent nominal bond). The firm's date−0 profit-maximization problem is: given state-contingent prices q t (S t ), choose sequences of output and labor (c F 1t
Substituting for c F 1t (S t ) from the constraint, the FOCs for all t, S t are
Consequently, for all t, S t we have p 1t (S t ) = p 2t (S t ) = p t (S t ) and
An agent who contracts on date 0 maximizes the expected utility
where we assume U is a real-valued function, twice continuously differentiable in each argument, strictly increasing in c j , decreasing in h, and concave. Maximization is subject to two constraints. One is the cash in advance constraint
where M t (S t−1 ) are money balances held at the start of t, brought in from the afternoon of t − 1, when the shock s t was not yet realized. Given this uncertainty, money may be held for the purpose of conducting transactions and for precautionary reasons.
The other constraint is the date−0 nominal intertemporal budget constraint:
The date−0 sources of funds areM initial money holdings (=initial liabilities of the central bank) and the firm's nominal value Π. The left hand side is the date−0 present value of net expenditure. It is calculated by considering the price of money delivered in the afternoon of t, q t (S t ). There are two elements:
1. Morning net expenditure: w t (S t )h t (S t ) wages earned, paid in the afternoon;
purchases of credit goods settled in the afternoon. These funds are available in the afternoon of t, where the date-0 value of one dollar is q t (S t ).
2. Afternoon net expenditures: the household receives Θ t transfers and exits the period holding M t+1 (S t ) money balances, so net expenditure is M t+1
with date−0 value q t (S t ).
Given that values can be history-dependent, we integrate over S t .
Consumers choose sequences of state-contingent consumption, labor and money holdings c 1t (S t ), c 2t (S t ), h t (S t ), and M t+1 (S t ) to maximize the Lagrangian:
where µ t (S t ) is the Kühn-Tucker multiplier on the cash constraint on t, given S t .
Omitting the arguments from U and f where understood, in an interior optimum the FOCs for all t and S t are:
Given p 2t (S t ) = p 1t (S t ) = p(S t ) and (4) we get
Risk-free rate and Central Bank constraint
Fix t and S t . The (reciprocal of the) nominal risk-free interest rate on a bond sold in the afternoon of t is 1 1+rt(S t ) . This is the price of a claim to money (bought on date 0) delivered in the afternoon of t + 1 conditional on S t (but not on s t+1 ) divided by the price of a claim to money delivered in the afternoon of t conditional on S t :
where the second step comes from the last line in (6) . 3
From (7), the interest rate makes households indifferent between buying money or risk-free bonds in the afternoon of t. With cash the consumer can buy either cashor credit-goods in t + 1; by holding bonds, he can only buy credit goods, as bonds mature in the afternoon of t + 1. So, the interest rate compensates consumers for the bond's illiquidity, which is why µ t+1 appears in the denominator of (8). Substituting
This is simply an indifference condition between buying an illiquid bond or holding money. The expected benefit from buying a risk-free bond in the afternoon of t that pays one dollar in the afternoon of t + 1 is (1 + r t (S t )) q t+1 (S t+1 )ds t+1 . Money has the lower expected value q t+1 (S t+1 )ds t+1 , but provides the liquidity premium 1 λ µ t+1 (S t+1 )ds t+1 because, unlike the bond, a dollar worth of money can be spent in the morning of t + 1 to buy cash goods.
LetM ≥ 0 be the initial money supply. In the afternoon of t, the central bank issuesM t+1 money, valued at q t (S t ) in date−0 prices, and retires it in the afternoon
Equivalently, the flow constraintM t+1 −M t = Θ t for all t, S t identify monetary policy. 3 No-arbitrage requires that expenditures in period 0 are equivalent. The household can spend q t (S t ) 1 1+rt(S t ) to buy 1 1+rt(S t ) delivered on t conditional on S t , and then reinvest on t the receipts in a risk-free bond to get 1 good on date t + 1. Alternatively, the agent can spend q t+1 (S t+1 )ds t+1 on date 0 to have one unit on date t + 1, given S t .
Juxtaposing the two models
To compare the LW model and the cash-in-advance model, we utilize the feature that the LW model can be reduced to a single difference equation [7, p. 469 ].
The main equation in the LW model
Agents in [7] alternate between two markets: decentralized (DM) and centralized (CM). First, the DM opens and DM goods are traded and then the CM opens and CM goods are traded. CM markets are Walrasian; in the DM there is pairwise trade with Nash bargaining and an agent has equal probability δ ≤ 1/2 (using our notation-see also the Appendix) to buy with money or to sell for money, so the ratio of buyers to sellers is one (assume no barter). Preferences are additively separable with quasilinear labor disutility:
where h 1 and h 2 denote labor effort in DM and CM, c 1 and c 2 denote consumption in DM and CM. It is assumed that u 1 , u 2 , η are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, u 1 and u 2 are concave, η is convex and u 1 (0) = η(0) = 0; furthermore,
We now discuss equilibrium in the LW model. 4 From [7, p.469], on each t equilibrium consumption of CM goods satisfies
Let θ ∈ (0, 1] denote the buyer's bargaining power. From [7, eq. (17)], in equilibrium
and, using [7, eq. (8) ] and omitting the time subscript
.
Equations (10) and (11) 
The key observation is that the DM pricing schedule is nonlinear due to bargaining, so the marginal benefit from spending one more dollar is 5 Such price distortion is measured by the ratio
where ψ(c 1 , 1) = 1 (no distortion) and ψ(c 1 , θ) < 1 for θ < 1. Figure 1 illustrates that the price distortion depends on θ.
Model consistency
To present a meaningful comparison, preferences, technologies, and shocks in the cashin-advance model must conform to those in the LW model. This section discusses how this logical coherence is achieved.
Technologies: Let F (h) = h as in the LW model. Since the marginal product of Notes to Figure 1 : The three curves correspond to ψ(c 1 ; θ) assuming-as in the calibration in [7] 
labor is fixed and independent of S t , it is convenient (and without loss in generality) to interpret production of goods 1 and 2 as occurring in two batches. The firm chooses h F jt (= labor demanded to produce good j = 1, 2) and c F jt (= supply) to solve Maximize:
Substituting the constraints, the FOCs are
for all t and j = 1, 2.
Prices equal marginal cost and profits are zero, so Π = 0.
Preferences and shocks: Let s t be an i.i.d. shock such that in each t a randomly drawn portion δ ∈ (0, 1) of households desires good 1 and produces it. Hence,
where f denotes the distribution of the date-t shock. Here s t = (s i t ) all i where
for all t ≥ 0 and all agents i where s i t = 0 means that household i neither derives utility from consuming good 1 nor can produce it. For any agent i, the marginal probabilities are thus f (9), where h i jt is labor supplied by household i to produce good j = 1, 2. For household i on date t we have:
Price distortion: A parsimonious way to match the price distortion ψ(c 1 , θ) is to introduce a proportional tax either on sales or purchases involving cash goods. For example, assume that a share 1 − τ of revenue from cash-sales-taken as given-must be rebated back to the firm's owners, lump-sum. For mnemonic ease, we refer to τ as the parameter of a "cash-revenue tax." The parameter τ distorts the relative price of cash and credit goods, without altering the model's structure or equilibrium concept.
In particular, the firm's problem is unchanged: we must simply substitute p 1t τ c F 1t for p 1t c F 1t , so that the first order condition for cash goods becomes p 1t τ = w 1t and p 1t
Because the buyer spends p 1t c 1t and the seller receives p 1t τ c 1t , we can interpret p 1t c 1t (1−τ ) as a sales tax and 1 τ −1 as the sales tax rate on cash transactions. Viewed in this manner, introducing the tax parameter τ does not amount to adding an unrealistic feature to the model; in fact, sales taxes are commonplace at the state and local level in many countries.
The main result
The literature based on the LW model has almost entirely focused on stationary equilibrium (one exception is [6] ). Consequently, we focus on stationary competitive equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model; later, we discuss what happens outside the steady state.
Proposition 1.
Consider the cash-in-advance model with preferences, technologies, and shocks as in the LW model, and a cash-revenue tax with parameter τ . If τ = ψ(c 1 , θ), then the equations characterizing stationary competitive equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model coincide with equations (10) and (12) , which characterize stationary equilibrium in the LW model. The cash-in-advance model can generate the same welfare costs of inflation as the LW model.
To provide support for this finding we start by deriving the main equations of the cash-in-advance model. Consider a generic household i. On date 0, he can spend q t (S t ) to buy a claim to one unit of money delivered in the afternoon of t, contingent on the history S t . Let q t be the price of money delivered on t unconditional on S t (= a risk-free discount bond). No-arbitrage requires equal expenditures, i.e.,
To keep the discussion focused, suppose τ = 1 (no tax, no price distortion). The problem of agent i is still given by (5), where we substitute q t (S t ) = q t f t (S t ), U from (14), separate the labor choices for each production batch, and set Π = 0 in the intertemporal budget constraint. 7 Household i chooses sequences c 1t (S t ), c 2t (S t ), h 1t (S t ), h 2t (S t ) and M t+1 (S t ) to maximize:
The FOCs, for all t and S t , are
The last line is derived using q t+1 f t+1 (S t+1 ) = q t+1 f (s t+1 )f t (S t ) and noticing that
From −β t + λw 2t (S t )q t = 0 we have that w 2t is independent of S t and therefore, using the firm's optimality conditions, p 2t is independent of S t . Since −β t +λw 2t q t = 0 and w 2t = p 2t (from the firm's problem), the optimal choice of credit goods in (16)
so c 2t (S t ) = c 2 for all t, S t and all agents i. This coincides with (10) .
Consider cash goods. Their consumption is heterogeneous because for if s i t = 0 for agent i, then c i 1t (S t ) = 0; this also implies µ t (S t ) = 0 for agent i because this agent's cash constraint does not bind. Now consider s i t = 1. We prove that if an agent desires to consume cash goods, then the quantity consumed is independent of the history of shocks S t and of the identity of the agent, i. Lemma 1. Consider any agent i and let s i t = 1. In competitive equilibrium:
Proof of Lemma 1. See Appendix
On date t, not everyone consumes cash goods (c i 1t = 0 when s i t = 0) but those who do consume an identical quantity c 1t , independent of the history of shocks. Since U is linear in h 2 , everyone saves the same amount of money M t (S t−1 ) = M t on t − 1, there is a degenerate distribution of money, and prices are history-independent. If µ t = 0, then u ′ 1 = η ′ and the agent consumes the efficient quantity c 1t = c * 1 . Otherwise, u ′ 1 > η ′ and c 1t = Mt p 1t < c * 1 (first and third equations in (16) with p 1t = w 1t ). Using the risk-free interest rate defined in (8), we have
The second equality holds by substituting q t (S t ) = q t f t (S t ) and noting that q t+1 f t+1
To perform the final step substitute
= q t from (16), use u ′ 2 (c 2t ) = 1, and define the gross inflation rate π t := p 2,t+1 p 2t . Now let M t+1 = γM t and consider stationary equilibrium with M t+1 p 2,t+1 = Mt p 2t , p 2,t+1 p 2t = γ and r t = r = γ β − 1 for all t. Equation (17) yields
The only difference between (18) and (12) is given by the price distortion in the LW model. Due to linear pricing, the marginal benefit from spending one more dollar on cash goods is
Now note that equation (18) coincides with (12) when θ = 1, since z ′ = η ′ ; intuitively, sellers are price-takers in both models. 8 Otherwise, when θ < 1, it does not because z ′ > η ′ , i.e., Nash bargaining induces a price distortion. This is evidence that the two frameworks' differences, in terms of stationary equilibrium allocations, reduce to differences in assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs those transactions that must be settled with the exchange of money. One wonders whether the distortion generated by the Nash bargaining solution can be reproduced by introducing a cash-revenue tax in the cash-in-advance model.
Re-introduce the cash-revenue tax parameter τ ≤ 1. The households' problem is (15) . 9 The FOCs are in (16), so the model still reduces to the difference equation (17). However, in stationary equilibrium relative prices are
This equation coincides with (12) if τ = ψ(c 1 , θ), which is when the cash-revenue tax in equilibrium reproduces the price distortion induced by Nash bargaining. The lesson is that, in stationary equilibrium, differences in the frameworks' main equations reduce to the price distortion due to bargaining. Such distortion can be replicated in the cash-in-advance model with an appropriate "tax" on revenues from cash transactions.
The result partially extends to non-stationary equilibrium.
Corollary 1. If η satisfies d ln η(h)
d ln h = κ > 0 and θ = 1, then the equations characterizing non-stationary competitive equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model coincide with (10) and (11), which characterize non-stationary equilibrium in the LW model.
The result immediately follows from Lemma 1. Rewrite equation (17) as
and note that it coincides with (11) (since z(c 1 ; 1) = η(c 1 )) and η ′ (c 1 )c 1 = κη(c 1 ). Both η linear and the common isoelastic
The correspondence between the equations characterizing non-stationary allocations in the two models breaks down when θ < 1. Again, the difference in allocations reduce to differences in assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs those transactions that must be settled with the exchange of money. 10 Hence, there may exist equilibria which are not the same in the two models. 9 The only difference is Π appears in the agent's budget constraint-as it did in (5)-due to lump-sum rebates from the firm. In equilibrium we have Π = ∞ t=0 q t f t (S t )T t dS t where the rebate T t = p 1,t (1 − τ )c 1t δ on t. 10 The equations characterizing non-stationary allocations coincide when DM goods are priced competitively.
Quantitative comparison
To evaluate possible quantitative differences between the cash-in-advance model and the LW model, we adopt the specification in [7, Table 1 ], which considers stationary equilibrium in the model calibrated to annual U.S. data.
Preferences over goods are defined by
for some a > 0, b ∈ (0, 1) and B > 0. Consumption c 2 satisfies (10), labor disutility
Define ex-ante welfare
Considering the compensating variation ∆, welfare at zero inflation is denoted
The welfare cost of γ − 1 inflation is the value 1 − ∆ where ∆ satisfies W 1 − W γ = 0.
In [7, p.475] , θ is calibrated to match the average price markup in U.S. data; the markup is z(c 1 ;θ) c 1 η ′ (c 1 ) , i.e., the ratio of the DM good price p 1 to marginal cost. 11 In our model the markup is p 1
because we match the price distortion in the LW model by setting τ = ψ(c 1 ; θ) and use the calibrated value of θ from the LW model. Hence, the markups in the two model generally do not coincide. 3 shows that the cash-in-advance model can yield identical welfare cost of inflation as in the LW model. Notes to Table 1 : The comparison involves the calibration in [7, Table 1 ]. The Parameters column reports our notation (the corresponding notation from [7] , when different from ours, is reported in parentheses). In both models c 2 = B in equilibrium and β −1 = 1.04. The inflation rate is γ − 1. When numbers are different in the two models we report them as the pair {LW, cash-in-advance}. 12 The share of DM output in the LW model is easily constructed, given that in the calibrated model everyone is matched in the DM (α = 1 in the LW model). DM output is δc 1 and CM output is c 2 ≡ B, in the calibrated model. Hence, total output is Y = δc 1 + B and the DM output share is δc1 Y (it increases as inflation falls because real money balances increase); this also gives us the share of cash goods to total goods in the cash-in-advance model. This share is used to calculate average markups. In the calibration, when θ = 0.5 we have τ = ψ(c 1 ; θ) = .719, .846, .928 for, respectively, γ = .1, 0, 1−β β ; the corresponding average sales tax rates are: .025, .037, .034. Instead, when θ = 0.343, we have τ = ψ(c 1 ; θ) = .511, .672, .802; the corresponding average sales tax rates are: .014, .019, .013. As inflation decreases the markup in cash trades, 1 τ , falls; yet, the average markup increases because the share of cash goods to total output rises.
In a nutshell, the cash-in-advance model can replicate the same, large welfare cost of inflation found in the LW mod7el, once price distortions are accounted for (cases [3] [4] . This suggests that the difference in the assumed pricing mechanisms is primarily what lies behind the dissimilarities in quantitative results between the two models, and not the explicit microfoundation for money in the LW model as opposed to the reduced-form approach of the other model.
Final comments
We have examined two monetary models characterized by periodic interactions in centralized and decentralized markets: the cash-in-advance model, and the model in [7] . Prices are linear in the former but are non-linear in the latter when trades must be settled with the exchange of cash, due to Nash bargaining. Our analysis indicates that this is the one difference that matters.
When the models are placed on equal footing in terms of preferences, technologies and shocks, both models reduce to a single equation describing stationary equilibrium. The equations coincide when sellers have no bargaining power. Otherwise, the equations differ in just one element-the price distortion from bargaining. Yet, such distortion can be replicated in the cash-in-advance model using a proportional tax.
For simplicity, we have considered a tax on cash revenues, in which case allocations and welfare costs of inflation are comparable in stationary equilibrium.
Our findings neither rely on altering the market structure of the LW model, nor the equilibrium concept or the basic structure of the cash-in-advance model. The analysis should neither be taken to imply that nothing can be done with one model, which could not be done with the other, nor that the models are identical. In fact, our analysis has emphasized the central role played by assumptions about the pricing mechanisms presumed to govern cash-based trades in the two models.
For the right-hand-side we get satisfies the agents' budget constraint.
from (16) and write the equation above as (17). Finally, from the firm's problem, we have η ′ (h 1t ) = w 1t w 2t = p 1t p 2t .
Comparing notations in [7] and in our model
In [7] , U(X) is the utility received from consuming X CM goods (u 2 (c 2 ) in our notation). The technology to produce CM goods is linear and the disutility from labor is linear. In the DM, a portion ασ (δ in our notation) of agents desires to consume (but cannot produce) and an identical portion can produce but does not consume; u(q) is the utility received from consuming q DM goods (u 1 (c 1 ) in our notation); c is the disutility from labor in the DM (η in our notation); the nominal price is d q per unit of consumption (p 1 in our notation); the real price is φd q , where φ is 1 p 2 in our notation. With binding cash constraints d = M and φM q where M is the agent's money holdings. We also have φM ≡ z(q) where 0 < θ ≤ 1 is the buyer's bargaining power. The nominal interest rate is i (r in our notation).
Supporting Materials for:
Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets Let s t denote a shock at time t, where the realization (also denoted s t ) is public knowledge in period t. The shock is drawn from a time-invariant set. Let {s t } ∞ t=0 denote a path of shocks and for t ≥ 1, S t = (s 1 , ..., s t ) ∈ S t a history of shocks, where S t is the set of all possible histories. Let f t (S t ) be the joint density of S t for t ≥ 1. Letting s t = (s 1t , s 2t ), we have s 1t as a shock in the CM and s 2t as a shock in the DM of t. For example, s 1t may be a shock to the money supply and s 2t may be a shock to TFP or to preferences. It is assumed that CM trades are carried out before s 2t is known. Therefore, S t = (s 1 , ..., s t ) is known in the DM of t, but only S t−1 = (s 1 , ..., s t−1 ) and s 1t are known in the CM of t. Hence, we use f t 1 (S t−1 , s 1t ) to denote the density of (S t−1 , s 1t ) and f t
Note that this maintains the key assumption that the random shock in the DM is not observed when money balances are chosen in the CM because s 2t is not known at the start of t (in the CM) but only in the middle of the period (in the DM).
Events on date t occur as follows.
Morning of t:
The CM is open. The shock s 1t is observed but not s 2t . Credit trades executed on t − 1 are settled. Firms pay wages for work supplied on t − 1 and pay dividends out of profits made on t − 1. Households pay for credit goods bought on t − 1. The central bank retires the old money supplyM t−1 (S t−2 , s 1,t−1 ) and issues a new money supplyM t (S t−1 , s 1t ) through lump-sum money transfers θ t (S t−1 , s 1t ) to households. Trade on a financial market also takes place. In the financial market households trade state-contingent claims to money to be delivered in the CM of date t + 1. As a consequence of the above activities, the household exits the CM holding M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) money.
Afternoon of t:
The DM is open. Household and firms trade goods 1 and 2, and labor. Households buy c 1t (S t ) goods in exchange for money (= cash goods), buy c 2t (S t ) goods on credit (=credit goods) and supply h t (S t ) labor to the firm on credit.
The firm demands h F t (S t ) labor, buying it on credit, and supplies F (h F t (S t ); S t ) goods. Credit trades are settled in the CM of t + 1.
Firm's optimal choices
where c F 1t (S t ), c F 2t (S t ) and h F t (S t ) are chosen in the DM of t, hence depend on S t . Because cash and credit goods are distinct, for full generality let p 1t (S t ) and p 2t (S t ) denote the nominal spot price of goods 1 and 2 in the DM of t, and let w t (S t ) be the nominal spot wage in the DM of t. These nominal prices are contingent on the history of shocks S t . Nominal profits (net dollar inflows) on t, given S t , are
which are distributed as dividends in the CM of t + 1.
Since the firm sells for cash and for credit in the DM of t, payments accrue as follows: in the CM of t + 1 it receives payments for credit sales in the DM of t; in the DM of t, it receives cash payments for contemporaneous cash-goods sales, which are carried into t + 1 as "overnight" balances. Now note that in the CM of t + 1 only the history S t and the shock s 1,t+1 are known (but not s 2,t+2 ). Let q t+1 (S t , s 1,t+1 ) denote the date−0 price of a claim to one dollar delivered in the CM of t + 1, contingent on (S t , s 1,t+1 ). The date−0 value of a dollar earned by the firm in the DM of t is q t+1 (S t , s 1,t+1 )ds 1,t+1 , because the dollar is paid out only on t + 1; this is simply the price of a claim to one dollar unconditionally delivered in the CM of t + 1. 15
In the CM of date 0 (= at the start of the economy) the firm chooses sequences 15 Equivalently, q t+1 (S t , s 1t+1 )ds 1,t+1 is the date-0 price of a state-contingent bond that delivers one dollar in the CM of date t + 1, conditional on S t . of output and labor to solve:
Substituting for c F 1t (S t ) from the constraint, the FOCs are
Households' optimal choices
Households choose consumption of cash and credit goods, and labor effort in the DM of t after observing the shock s t = (s 1t , s 2t ). Consumption on t is thus conditional on the history S t = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s t ).
Below we solve the problem faced by an agent who contracts on date 0. 16 On date 0 households maximize expected utility
subject to a cash in advance constraint for good 1
where we have used p 1t (S t ) = p 2t (S t ) = p t (S t ). Here M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) denotes money holdings in the DM of t, which are bought in the CM of t, when s 2t is not yet known. Given this uncertainty, money may be held for transactions purposes and for 16 The formulation with sequential contracting is available from the authors upon request.
precautionary reasons.
The households date−0 budget constraint in nominal prices is i.e., in the CM. Net expenditure consists of two elements:
1. Net expenditure in the CM of t: the agent exits the CM holding M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) money balances that have date−0 value q t (S t−1 , s 1t ). Since the agent receives
2. Net expenditures in the DM of t: the agent earns w t (S t )h t (S t ) wages during t,
which are paid on t + 1; M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) − p t (S t )c 1t (S t ) money balances are not spent on t and are carried over to t+1; p t (S t )c 2t (S t ) is the expenditure on credit goods on t, paid on t + 1. These funds are available in the CM of t + 1; hence, their date-0 value is q t+1 (S t , s 1,t+1 )ds 1,t+1 .
The date-0 value of net expenditure depends on the initial shock s 20 and the history of shocks S t ; hence the double integral.
Consumers choose c 1t (S t ), c 2t (S t ), h t (S t ), and M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) for all t and S t to maximize the Lagrangian:
where µ t (S t ) is the Kühn-Tucker multiplier on the cash in advance constraint on t,
given history S t .
Omitting the arguments from U and f where understood, taking the partial of L relative to c 1t (S t ), c 2t (S t ), h t (S t ) and M t (S t−1 , s 1t ), in an interior optimum we have respectively:
All but the last expression are valid for all t, s 20 , S t ,while the last expression is valid for all t, s 20 , s 1t , and S t−1 . The last expression holds because M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) > 0.
Noticing that q t (S t−1 , s 1t )ds 2t = q t (S t−1 , s 1t ) we rewrite the last equation in (6) as
In a representative agent setting, given market clearing h t = h F t , from (4) and (6) we get
The marginal rate of substitution between goods 1 and 2 is
for all t, s 20 , S t .
As a means of comparison, we later report the main equations for the completemarkets model without money.
Monetary policy
LetM ≥ 0 denote initial money balances, on date 0. In the CM of each period t,
the central bank issues a new money supplyM t (S t−1 , s 1t ) using lump-sum transfers θ t (S t−1 , s 1t ). Hence, the money supply process can be history-dependent, but is not dependent on s 2t , because that shock is not observed until the DM opens in t. In the CM of t + 1,the central bank retires the money supply issued on t, and issues a new money supply. The date−0 value of assets held by the central bank in the CM of t isM t (S t−1 , s 1t )q t (S t−1 , s 1t ). The liabilities include the lump-sum transfers θ t (S t−1 , s 1t )q t (S t−1 , s 1t ) and the cost of retiring the money supply on t + 1, which is M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) q t+1 (S t , s 1,t+1 )ds 1,t+1 ds 2t , given the uncertainty on s 2t and s 1,t+1 .
The intertemporal budget constraint of the central bank is thus
{M t (S t−1 , s 1t ) [q t (S t−1 , s 1t ) − q t+1 (S t , s 1,t+1 )ds 1,t+1 ds 2t ] −θ t (S t−1 , s 1t )q t (S t−1 , s 1t )}d(S t−1 , s 1,t ), which can be rewritten as a set of flow constraints (see later section)
That is, each money injection equals the lump-sum-transfer in that period.
To see how to derive the flow constraint in (8) note that, on any date τ > 0, there areM t−1 outstanding liabilities, hence we have
and updating this expression we have
To derive a flow constraint for the central bank we now fixM t (S t−1 , s 1t ), which means that the shocks (S t−1 , s 1t ) are known. Take the difference between (9) and (10) . The right hands side of (9) minus the right hands side of (10) is M t (S t−1 , s 1t )[q t (S t−1 , s 1t ) − q t+1 (S t , s 1,t+1 )ds 1,t+1 ds 2t ] − Θ t (S t−1 , s 1t )q t (S t−1 , s 1t ).
The difference of the left hand sides is q t (S t−1 , s 1t )M t−1 (S t−2 , s 1,t−1 ) − q t+1 (S t , s 1,t+1 )M t (S t−1 , s 1t ).
Equating the differences in LHS and RHS, and integrating both sides with respect to s 1,t+1 and s 2t , we obtain the flow constraint of the Central Bank
second. On date 0, agents choose consumption and labor plans given state-contingent prices to solve maximize:
where A ≥ 0 denotes the maximized value of the firm's objective function (the value of the firm on date 0). The constraint implies that the net present value of planned expenditure (consumption minus labor income) must equal the value of the firm on date 0. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint and let U i = ∂U (x) ∂x i for x = (x i ) i∈I . The first order conditions in an interior optimum are
The equations in (13) and (14), and the relevant constraints implicitly define the set of stochastic processes for quantities and prices that support a competitive equilibrium. Equilibrium relative prices satisfy π ht (S t ) π t (S t ) = U h (c t (S t ), h t (S t )) U c (c t (S t ), h t (S t )) for all t, S t .
If there is no heterogeneity in labor plans, then labor market clearing requires h F t (S t ) = h t (S t ). From (13) , it follows that equilibrium quantities must satisfy
Using (14), the relative price for claims to goods delivered on date τ > t is
for all t, τ, S t , S τ Given a sequence of shocks {s t } ∞ t=0 , equation (15) and feasibility (11) define the equilibrium allocation {c t (S t ), h t (S t )} ∞ t=0 .
